very man of his
command in its execution."

Hooker also states that Warren was sent to Sedgwick on account of
his familiarity with the ground, and to impress upon the latter the
necessity of strict compliance with the order.

"I supposed, and am still of the opinion, that, if Gen. Sedgwick's
men had shouldered arms and advanced at the time named, he would have
encountered less resistance and suffered less loss; but, as it was,
it was late when he went into Fredericksburg, and before he was in
readiness to attack the heights in rear of the town, which was about
eleven o'clock A.M. on the 3d, the enemy had observed his movement, and
concentrated almost their entire force at that point to oppose him." "He
had the whole force of the enemy there to run against in carrying the
heights beyond Fredericksburg, but he carried them with ease; and,
by his movements after that, I think no one would infer that he was
confident in himself, and the enemy took advantage of it. I knew Gen.
Sedgwick very well: he was a classmate of mine, and I had been through a
great deal of service with him. He was a perfectly brave man, and a good
one; but when it came to manoeuvring troops, or judging of positions for
them, in my judgment he was not able or expert. Had Gen. Reynolds been
left with that independent command, I have no doubt the result would
have been very different." "When the attack was made, it had to be upon
the greater part of the enemy's force left on the right: nevertheless
the troops advanced, carried the heights without heavy loss, and
leisurely took up their line of march on the plank road, advancing two
or three miles that day."

Now, this is scarcely a fair statement of facts. And yet they were all
spread before Hooker, in the reports of the Sixth Corps and of Gibbon.
No doubt Sedgwick was bound, as far as was humanly possible, to
obey that order; but, as in "losing every man in his command" in its
execution, he would scarcely have been of great eventual utility to his
chief, he did the only wise thing, in exercising ordinary discretion as
to the method of attacking the enemy in his path. Hooker's assumption
that Sedgwick was on the north side of the Rappahannock was his own, and
not Sedgwick's fault. Hooker might certainly have supposed that Sedgwick
had obeyed his previous orders, in part at least.

Sedgwick testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
"I have understood that evidence has appeared before th