e been in position to make upon their
flank and rear.
Keeping in view all the facts,--that Sedgwick was on unknown ground,
with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with
Sedgwick's every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a
few months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that
the night was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by
this order,--it seems that to expect him to carry the heights before
daylight, savors of exorbitance.
But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in
some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous
construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton
and Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the
works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the
instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the canal,
and Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the assaulting columns,
after ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless.
All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of the
responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker's to
Sedgwick's shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and
impracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick's corps as an
element in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville.
Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than
those of Sickles on Saturday, and no one has undertaken to criticise the
latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking
Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed,
when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on
Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious
as every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to
assault Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford.
In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how
unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from Gen.
Butterfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War.
"From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was
not over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. This
information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday by
Gen. Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, if
they did not receive re-enforcement
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