aneously directed to move on the left of Hazel
Run, and turn the enemy's right; but he found the works in his front
beset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precluded
any movement of his division to the right.

By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, and
Gibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn the
enemy's flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works could
not be captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative of
assaulting them in regular form.

It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye's
heights, might have carried them with little loss, and with so much less
expense of time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church,
without being seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee.

And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of Gen.
Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker's self-defence on the
score of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully.

Sedgwick asserts with truth, that all despatches to him assumed that he
had but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as to
what he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises.
Himself was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right and
left, and the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchments
on the heights.

Moreover, what had misled Butterfield into supposing, and informing
Sedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned,
was a balloon observation of Early's march to join Lee under the
mistaken orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alert
wherever Sedgwick tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of the
ground enabled him to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell;
while Sedgwick was groping his way through the darkness, knowing
his enemy's ability to lure him into an ambuscade, and taking his
precautions accordingly.

XXVII. SEDGWICK'S ASSAULT.

Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general assault, he can scarcely
be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months
before, a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences
against half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful
dispositions seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to
be almost supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time
consumed in these precautions