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rder. _Qui veri esse aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the [Greek: skotie gnosis] of Democr., by which he meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a [Greek: gnesie gnosis], dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist [Greek: eteei] and not merely [Greek: nomoi] as appearances do. See R. and P. 51. Sec.74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of Empedocles about the possibility of [Greek: episteme] see the remarks of Sextus _A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides, Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_ I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_: Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, [Greek: mempsaito d' an tis Parmenidou ten stichopoiian]. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_: for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41. _Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_: cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 [Greek: eoika goun toutou smikroi tini autoi toutoi sophoteros einai, hoti a me oida oude oiomai eidenai], a very different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That [Greek: episteme] in the strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. _De Platone_: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real [Greek: episteme] is attainable. _Ironiam_: the word was given in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio persequi_: n. on 17. Sec.75. _Videorne_: = _nonne videor_, as
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