ided the
nature of man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional, the
former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. _T.D._ II. 47, and
Arist. [Greek: to men hos logon echon, to de epipeithes logoi]); Zeno
however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist
solely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek: hegemonikon] (Zeller
203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248,
_D.F._ III. _passim_). When the [Greek: hegemonikon] was in a perfect
state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or
emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a
war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war
carried on in one and the same country. _Virtutis usum_: cf. the
description of Aristotle's _finis_ in _D.F._ II. 19. _Ipsum habitum_: the
mere possession. So Plato, _Theaetet._ 197 B, uses the word [Greek: hexis],
a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the
_Ethics_ of Arist. In this sense virtue is _not_ a [Greek: hexis],
according to the Stoics, but a [Greek: diathesis] (Stob. II. 6, 5, Diog.
VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek: hexis],
VII. 92, 93; cf. Zeller 249, with footnotes). _Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse
... uteretur_: cf. Stob. II. 6, 6 [Greek: duo gene ton anthropon einai to
men ton spoudaion, to de ton phaulon, kai to men ton spoudaion dia pantos
tou biou chresthai tais aretais, to de ton phaulon tais kakiais].
_Perturbationem_: I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of
Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm's text of the
_Acad._ appears, should read the plural _perturbationes_, a conj. of
Walker. _Perturbationem_ means emotion in the abstract; _perturbationes_
below, particular emotions. There is exactly the same transition in _T.D._
III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while _perturbatio_ is used, in the same
sense as here, in at least five other passages of the _T.D._, i.e. IV. 8,
11, 24, 57, 82. _Quasi mortis_: a trans. of Stoic [Greek: pathesi], which
Cic. rejects in _D.F._ III. 35. _Voluit carere sapientem_: emotion being a
disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue
(20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228
sq.). All emotions are reasonless; [Greek: hedone] or _laetitia_ for
instance is [Greek: alogos eparsis]. (_T.D._ Books III. and IV. treat
la