It will be necessary to consider the nature of this office, to
enable us to come to a right decision on the subject; in analyzing its
properties, we shall easily discover they are not purely of an executive
nature. It seems to me that they partake of a judiciary quality as well
as executive; perhaps the latter obtains in the greatest degree. The
principal duty seems to be deciding upon the lawfulness and justice of
the claims and accounts subsisting between the United States and
particular citizens: this partakes strongly of the judicial character,
and there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not
hold his office at the pleasure of the executive branch of the
government."[314] In Humphrey _v._ United States,[315] decided in 1935,
the Court seized upon "the nature of the office" concept and applied it
as a much needed corrective to the Myers holding.
The Humphrey Case
The material element of this case was that Humphrey, a member of the
Federal Trade Commission, was on October 7, 1933, notified by President
Roosevelt that he was "removed" from office, the reason being their
divergent views of public policy. In due course Humphrey sued for
salary. Distinguishing the Myers case, Justice Sutherland, speaking for
the unanimous Court, said: "A postmaster is an executive officer
restricted to the performance of executive functions. He is charged with
no duty at all related to either the legislative or judicial power. The
actual decision in the _Myers_ Case finds support in the theory that
such an office is merely one of the units in the executive department
and, hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of
removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aid he is. * * *
It goes no farther;--much less does it include an officer who occupies
no place in the executive department and who exercise no part of the
executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.
"The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body created by
Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the
statute * * * Such a body cannot in any proper sense be characterized as
an arm or eye of the executive. Its duties are performed without
executive leave and, in the contemplation of the statute, must be free
from executive control. * * * We think it plain under the Constitution
that illimitable power of removal is not possessed by the President in
respect of officers of the c
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