nds, in the same degree, to the
final overthrow of such governments. Our representative systems suppose,
that, in exercising the high right of suffrage, the greatest of all
political rights, and in forming opinions on great public measures, men
will act conscientiously, under the influence of public principle and
patriotic duty; and that, in supporting or opposing men or measures,
there will be a general prevalence of honest, intelligent judgment and
manly independence. These presumptions lie at the foundation of all hope
of maintaining governments entirely popular. Whenever personal,
individual, or selfish motives influence the conduct of individuals on
public questions, they affect the safety of the whole system. When these
motives run deep and wide, and come in serious conflict with higher,
purer, and more patriotic purposes, they greatly endanger that system;
and all will admit that, if they become general and overwhelming, so
that all public principle is lost sight of, and every election becomes a
mere scramble for office, the system inevitably must fall. Every wise
man, in and out of government, will endeavor, therefore, to promote the
ascendency of public virtue and public principle, and to restrain as far
as practicable, in the actual operation of our institutions, the
influence of selfish and private interests.

I concur with those who think, that, looking to the present, and looking
also to the future, and regarding all the probabilities that await us in
reference to the character and qualities of those who may fill the
executive chair, it is important to the stability of government and the
welfare of the people that there should be a check to the progress of
official influence and patronage. The unlimited power to grant office,
and to take it away, gives a command over the hopes and fears of a vast
multitude of men. It is generally true, that he who controls another
man's means of living controls his will. Where there are favors to be
granted, there are usually enough to solicit for them; and when favors
once granted may be withdrawn at pleasure, there is ordinarily little
security for personal independence of character. The power of giving
office thus affects the fears of all who are in, and the hopes of all
who are out. Those who are _out_ endeavor to distinguish themselves by
active political friendship, by warm personal devotion, by clamorous
support of men in whose hands is the power of reward; while thos