ges just such a
tenure as the Constitution has itself provided; that is to say, a right
to hold during good behavior; and I am of opinion that such a law would
have been perfectly constitutional. It is by law, in England, that the
judges are made independent of the removing power of the crown. I do not
think that the Constitution, by giving the power of appointment, or the
power both of appointment and removal, to the President and Senate,
intended to impose any restraint on the legislature, in regard to its
authority of regulating the duties, powers, duration, or responsibility
of office. I agree, that Congress ought not to do any thing which shall
essentially impair that right of nomination and appointment of certain
officers, such as ministers, judges, &c., which the Constitution has
vested in the President and Senate. But while the power of nomination
and appointment is left fairly where the Constitution has placed it, I
think the whole field of regulation is open to legislative discretion.
If a law were to pass, declaring that district attorneys, or collectors
of customs, should hold their offices four years, unless removed on
conviction for misbehavior, no one could doubt its constitutional
validity; because the legislature is naturally competent to prescribe
the tenure of office. And is a reasonable check on the power of removal
any thing more than a qualification of the tenure of office? Let it be
always remembered, that the President's removing power, as now
exercised, is claimed and held under the general clause vesting in him
the executive authority. It is implied, or inferred, from that clause
alone.

Now, if it is properly derived from that source, since the Constitution
does not say how it shall be limited, how defined, or how carried into
effect, it seems especially proper for Congress, under the general
provision of the Constitution which gives it authority to pass all laws
necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred on any department,
to regulate the subject of removal. And the regulation here required is
of the gentlest kind. It only provides that the President shall make
known to the Senate his reasons for removal of officers of this
description, when he does see fit to remove them. It might, I think,
very justly go farther. It might, and perhaps it ought, to prescribe the
form of removal, and the proof of the fact. It might, I also think,
declare that the President should only suspend officer