a very erroneous estimate of the
character of the people of this country, who supposes that a feeling of
this kind is to be trifled with or despised. It will assuredly cause
itself to be respected. It may be reasoned with, it may be made willing,
I believe it is entirely willing, to fulfil all existing engagements and
all existing duties, to uphold and defend the Constitution as it is
established, with whatever regrets about some provisions which it does
actually contain. But to coerce it into silence, to endeavor to restrain
its free expression, to seek to compress and confine it, warm as it is,
and more heated as such endeavors would inevitably render it,--should
this be attempted, I know nothing, even in the Constitution or in the
Union itself, which would not be endangered by the explosion which might
follow.

I see, therefore, no political necessity for the annexation of Texas to
the Union; no advantages to be derived from it; and objections to it of
a strong, and, in my judgment, decisive character.

I believe it to be for the interest and happiness of the whole Union to
remain as it is, without diminution and without addition.

Gentlemen, I pass to other subjects. The rapid advancement of the
executive authority is a topic which has already been alluded to.

I believe there is serious cause of alarm from this source. I believe
the power of the executive has increased, is increasing, and ought now
to be brought back within its ancient constitutional limits. I have
nothing to do with the motives which have led to those acts, which I
believe to have transcended the boundaries of the Constitution. Good
motives may always be assumed, as bad motives may always be imputed.
Good intentions will always be pleaded for every assumption of power;
but they cannot justify it, even if we were sure that they existed. It
is hardly too strong to say, that the Constitution was made to guard the
people against the dangers of good intention, real or pretended. When
bad intentions are boldly avowed, the people will promptly take care of
themselves. On the other hand, they will always be asked why they should
resist or question that exercise of power which is so fair in its
object, so plausible and patriotic in appearance, and which has the
public good alone confessedly in view? Human beings, we may be assured,
will generally exercise power when they can get it; and they will
exercise it most undoubtedly, in popular governments, und