es making the cession expected Congress to exercise over the
District precisely that power, and neither more nor less, which the
Constitution had conferred upon it. I do not know how the provision, or
the intention, either of the Constitution in granting the power, or of
the States in making the cession, could be expressed in a manner more
absolutely free from all doubt or ambiguity.
I see, therefore, nothing in the act of cession, and nothing in the
Constitution, and nothing in the history of this transaction, and
nothing in any other transaction, implying any limitation upon the
authority of Congress.
If the assertion contained in this resolution be true, a very strange
result, as it seems to me, must follow. The resolution affirms that the
faith of Congress is pledged, indefinitely. It makes no limitation of
time or circumstance. If this be so, then it is an obligation that binds
us for ever, as much as if it were one of the prohibitions of the
Constitution itself. And at all times hereafter, even if, in the course
of their history, availing themselves of events, or changing their views
of policy, the States themselves should make provision for the
emancipation of their slaves, the existing state of things could not be
changed, nevertheless, in this District. It does really seem to me,
that, if this resolution, in its terms, be true, though slavery in every
other part of the world may be abolished, yet in the metropolis of this
great republic it is established in perpetuity. This appears to me to be
the result of the doctrine of plighted faith, as stated in the
resolution.
In reply to Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Webster
said:--#/
The words of the resolution speak for themselves. They require no
comment. They express an unlimited plighted faith. The honorable member
will so see if he will look at those words. The gentleman asks whether
those who made the cession could have expected that Congress would ever
exercise such a power. To this I answer, that I see no reason to doubt
that the parties to the cession were as willing to leave this as to
leave other powers to the discretion of Congress. I see not the
slightest evidence of any especial fear, or any especial care or
concern, on the part of the ceding States, in regard to this particular
part of the jurisdiction ceded to Congress. And I think I can ask, on
the other side, a very important question for the consideration of the
gentleman himself, and for that of t
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