arisen in which the authority ought to
be exercised, I might not have felt bound to reject the vote. There are
some precedents which might favor such a contingent provision, though
the practice is dangerous, and ought not to be followed except in cases
of clear necessity.
But the insurmountable objection to the proposed grant was, that it
specified no objects. It was as general as language could make it. It
embraced every expenditure that could be called either military or
naval. It was to include "fortifications, ordnance, and the increase of
the navy," but it was not confined to these. It embraced the whole
general subject of military service. Under the authority of such a law,
the President might repair ships, build ships, buy ships, enlist seamen,
and do any thing and every thing else touching the naval service,
without restraint or control.
He might repair such fortifications as he saw fit, and neglect the rest;
arm such as he saw fit, and neglect the arming of others; or build new
fortifications wherever he chose. But these unlimited powers over the
fortifications and the navy constitute by no means the most dangerous
part of the proposed authority; because, under that authority, his power
to raise and employ land forces would be equally absolute and
uncontrolled. He might levy troops, embody a new army, call out the
militia in numbers to suit his own discretion, and employ them as he saw
fit.
Now, Sir, does our legislation, under the Constitution, furnish any
precedent for all this?
We make appropriations for the army, and we understand what we are
doing, because it is "the army," that is to say, the army established by
law. We make appropriations for the navy; they, too, are for "the navy,"
as provided for and established by law. We make appropriations for
fortifications, but we say what fortifications, and we assign to each
its intended amount of the whole sum. This is the usual course of
Congress on such subjects; and why should it be departed from? Are we
ready to say that the power of fixing the places for new fortifications,
and the sum allotted to each; the power of ordering new ships to be
built, and fixing the number of such new ships; the power of laying out
money to raise men for the army; in short, every power, great or small,
respecting the military and naval service, shall be vested in the
President, without specification of object or purpose, to the entire
exclusion of the exercise of all
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