ned here for
weeks, or months, the incumbents all the while continuing to discharge
their official duties, and relinquishing their offices only when the
nominations of their successors have been confirmed, and commissions
issued to them; so that, if a nomination be confirmed, the _nomination
itself_ makes no removal; the removal then waits to be brought about by
the _appointment_. But if the nomination be _rejected_, then the
_nomination itself_, it is contended, has effected the removal. Who can
defend opinions which lead to such results?

These reasons, Sir, incline me strongly to the opinion, that, upon a
just construction of the Constitution, the power of removal is part of,
or a necessary result from, the power of appointment, and, therefore,
that it _ought to have been_ exercised by the Senate concurrently with
the President.

The argument may be strengthened by various illustrations. The
Constitution declares that Congress may vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in
the heads of departments; and Congress has passed various acts providing
for appointments, according to this regulation of the Constitution. Thus
the Supreme Court, and other courts of the United States, have authority
to appoint their clerks; heads of departments also appoint their own
clerks, according to statute provisions; and it has never been doubted
that these courts, and these heads of departments, may remove their
clerks at pleasure, although nothing is said in the laws respecting such
power of removal. Now, it is evident that neither the courts nor the
heads of departments acquire the right of removal under a general grant
of executive power, for none such is made to them; nor upon the ground
of any general injunction to see the laws executed, for no such general
injunction is addressed to them. They nevertheless hold the power of
removal, as all admit, and they must hold it, therefore, simply as
incident to, or belonging to, the power of appointment. There is no
other clause under which they can possibly claim it.

Again, let us suppose that the Constitution had given to the President
the power of appointment, without consulting the Senate. Suppose it had
said, "The President shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers,
judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United
States." If the Constitution had stood thus, the President would
unquestionably have possessed