the operation of this law, the President
can deprive a man of office without taking the responsibility of
removing him. The law itself vacates the office, and gives the means of
rewarding a friend without the exercise of the power of removal at all.
Here is increased power, with diminished responsibility. Here is a still
greater dependence, for the means of living, on executive favor, and, of
course, a new dominion acquired over opinion and over conduct. The power
of removal is, or at least formerly was, a suspected and odious power.
Public opinion would not always tolerate it; and still less frequently
did it approve it. Something of character, something of the respect of
the intelligent and patriotic part of the community, was lost by every
instance of its unnecessary exercise. This was some restraint. But the
law of 1820 took it all away. It vacated offices periodically, by its
own operation, and thus added to the power of removal, which it left
still existing in full force, a new and extraordinary facility for the
extension of patronage, influence, and favoritism.

I would ask every member of the Senate if he does not perceive, daily,
effects which may be fairly traced to this cause. Does he not see a
union of purpose, a devotion to power, a co-operation in action, among
all who hold office, quite unknown in the earlier periods of the
government? Does he not behold, every hour, a stronger development of
the principle of personal attachment, and a corresponding diminution of
genuine and generous public feeling? Was indiscriminate support of party
measures, was unwavering fealty, was regular suit and service, ever
before esteemed such important and essential parts of official duty?

Sir, the theory of our institutions is plain; it is, that government is
an agency created for the good of the people, and that every person in
office is the agent and servant of the people. Offices are created, not
for the benefit of those who are to fill them, but for the public
convenience; and they ought to be no more in number, nor should higher
salaries be attached to them, than the public service requires. This is
the theory. But the difficulty in practice is, to prevent a direct
reversal of all this; to prevent public offices from being considered as
intended for the use and emolument of those who can obtain them. There
is a headlong tendency to this, and it is necessary to restrain it by
wise and effective legislation. There is sti