be formed and expressed without fear or favor, and with a
more entire regard to their true and real merits or demerits. It will
be, so far as its effects reach, an auxiliary to patriotism and public
virtue, in their warfare against selfishness and cupidity.
The second check on executive patronage contained in this bill is of
still greater importance than the first. This provision is, that,
whenever the President removes any of these officers from office, he
shall state to the Senate the reasons for such removal. This part of the
bill has been opposed, both on constitutional grounds and on grounds of
expediency.
The bill, it is to be observed, expressly recognizes and admits the
actual existence of the power of removal. I do not mean to deny, and the
bill does not deny, that, at the present moment, the President may
remove these officers at will, because the early decision adopted that
construction, and the laws have since uniformly sanctioned it. The law
of 1820, intended to be repealed by this bill, expressly affirms the
power. I consider it, therefore, a settled point; settled by
construction, settled by precedent, settled by the practice of the
government, and settled by statute. At the same time, after considering
the question again and again within the last six years, I am very
willing to say, that, in my deliberate judgment, the original decision
was wrong. I cannot but think that those who denied the power in 1789
had the best of the argument; and yet I will not say that I know myself
so thoroughly as to affirm, that this opinion may not have been
produced, in some measure, by that abuse of the power which has been
passing before our eyes for several years. It is possible that this
experience of the evil may have affected my view of the constitutional
argument. It appears to me, however, after thorough and repeated and
conscientious examination, that an erroneous interpretation was given to
the Constitution, in this respect, by the decision of the first
Congress; and I will ask leave to state, shortly, the reasons for that
opinion, although there is nothing in this bill which proposes to
disturb that decision.
The Constitution nowhere says one word of the power of removal from
office, except in the case of conviction on impeachment. Wherever the
power exists, therefore, except in cases of impeachment, it must exist
as a constructive or incidental power. If it exists in the President
alone, it must exist in
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