day named will be, appointed. If
there be any instances in which such notice is given without express
reference to the appointment of a successor, they are few; and even in
these, such reference must be implied; because in no case is there any
distinct official act of removal, that I can find, unconnected with the
act of appointment. At any rate, it is the usual practice, and has been
from the first, to consider the appointment as producing the removal of
the previous incumbent. When the President desires to remove a person
from office, he sends a message to the Senate nominating some other
person. The message usually runs in this form: "I nominate A.B. to be
collector of the customs, &c., in the place of C.D., removed." If the
Senate advise and consent to this nomination, C.D. is effectually out of
office, and A.B. is in, in his place. The same effect would be produced,
if the message should say nothing of any removal. Suppose A.B. to be
Secretary of State, and the President to send us a message, saying
merely, "I nominate C.D. to be Secretary of State." If we confirm this
nomination, C.D. becomes Secretary of State, and A.B. is necessarily
removed.

I have gone into these details and particulars, Sir, for the purpose of
showing, that, not only in the nature of things, but also according to
the practice of the government, the power of removal is incident to the
power of appointment. It belongs to it, is attached to it, forms a part
of it, or results from it.

If this be true, the inference is manifest. If the power of removal,
when not otherwise regulated by Constitution or law, be part and parcel
of the power of appointment, or a necessary incident to it, then whoever
holds the power of appointment holds also the power of removal. But it
is the President and the Senate, and not the President alone, who hold
the power of appointment; and therefore, according to the true
construction of the Constitution, it should be the President and Senate,
and not the President alone, who hold the power of removal.

The decision of 1789 has been followed by a very strange and
indefensible anomaly, showing that it does not rest on any just
principle. The natural connection between the appointing power and the
removing power has, as I have already stated, always led the President
to bring about a removal by the process of a new appointment. This is
quite efficient for his purpose, when the Senate confirms the new
nomination. One ma