w be
known, and I submit them to the judgment of the present and of after
times. Sir, the occasion is full of interest. It cannot pass off without
leaving strong impressions on the character of public men. A collision
has taken place which I could have most anxiously wished to avoid; but
it was not to be shunned. We have not sought this controversy; it has
met us, and been forced upon us. In my judgment, the law has been
disregarded, and the Constitution transgressed; the fortress of liberty
has been assaulted, and circumstances have placed the Senate in the
breach; and, although we may perish in it, I know we shall not fly from
it. But I am fearless of consequences. We shall hold on, Sir, and hold
out, till the people themselves come to its defence. We shall raise the
alarm, and maintain the post, till they whose right it is shall decide
whether the Senate be a faction, wantonly resisting lawful power, or
whether it be opposing, with firmness and patriotism, violations of
liberty and inroads upon the Constitution.

[Footnote 1: Commonly called the Sedition Act, approved 14th July,
1798.]

[Footnote 2: South Carolina.]

THE APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWER.

DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 16TH OF FEBRUARY,
1835, ON THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO REPEAL THE FIRST
AND SECOND SECTIONS OF THE ACT TO LIMIT THE TERM OF SERVICE OF CERTAIN
OFFICERS THEREIN NAMED."

Mr. President,--The professed object of this bill is the reduction of
executive influence and patronage. I concur in the propriety of that
object. Having no wish to diminish or to control, in the slightest
degree, the constitutional and legal authority of the presidential
office, I yet think that the indirect and rapidly increasing influence
which it possesses, and which arises from the power of bestowing office
and of taking it away again at pleasure, and from the manner in which
that power seems now to be systematically exercised, is productive of
serious evils.

The extent of the patronage springing from this power of appointment and
removal is so great, that it brings a dangerous mass of private and
personal interest into operation in all great public elections and
public questions. This is a mischief which has reached, already, an
alarming height. The principle of republican governments, we are taught,
is public virtue; and whatever tends either to corrupt this principle,
to debase it, or to weaken its force, te