s has been, and always must be, unless the
Constitution be changed, intrusted to the executive department. No
officer can be created by Congress, for the purpose of taking
charge of it, whose appointment would not, by the Constitution, at
once devolve on the President, and who would not be responsible to
him for the faithful performance of his duties."

And, in another place, it declares that "Congress cannot, therefore,
take out of the hands of the executive department the custody of the
public property or money, without an assumption of executive power, and
a subversion of the first principles of the Constitution." These, Sir,
are propositions which cannot receive too much attention. They affirm,
that the custody of the public money constitutionally and necessarily
belongs to the executive; and that, until the Constitution is changed,
Congress cannot take it out of his hands, nor make any provision for its
custody, except by such superintendents and keepers as are appointed by
the President and removable at his will. If these assertions be correct,
we have, indeed, a singular constitution for a republican government;
for we give the executive the control, the custody, and the possession
of the public treasury, by original constitutional provision; and when
Congress appropriates, it appropriates only what is already in the
President's hands.

Sir, I hold these propositions to be sound in neither branch. I maintain
that the custody of the public money does not necessarily belong to the
executive, under this government; and I hold that Congress may so
dispose of it, that it shall be under the superintendence of keepers not
appointed by the President, nor removable at his will. I think it
competent for Congress to declare, as Congress did declare in the bank
charter, that the public deposits should be made in the bank. When in
the bank, they were not kept by persons appointed by the President, or
removable at his will. He could not change that custody; nor could it be
changed at all, but according to provisions made in the law itself.
There was, indeed, a provision in the law authorizing the _Secretary_
to change the custody. But suppose there had been no such provision;
suppose the contingent power had not been given to the Secretary; would
it not have been a lawful enactment? Might not the law have provided
that the public moneys should remain in the bank, until Congress itself
should otherwise