order, leaving no power of removal anywhere else? And
if such provision had been made, what power, or custody, or control,
would the President have possessed over them? Clearly, none at all. The
act of May, 1800, directed custom-house bonds, in places where the bank
which was then in existence was situated, or in which it had branches,
to be deposited in the bank or its branches for collection, without the
reservation to the Secretary, or anybody else, of any power of removal.
Now, Sir, this was an unconstitutional law, if the Protest, in the part
now under consideration, be correct; because it placed the public money
in a custody beyond the control of the President, and in the hands of
keepers not appointed by him, nor removable at his pleasure. One may
readily discern, Sir, the process of reasoning by which the author of
the Protest brought himself to the conclusion that Congress could not
place the public moneys beyond the President's control. It is all
founded on the power of appointment and the power of removal. These
powers, it is supposed, must give the President complete control and
authority over those who actually hold the money, and therefore must
necessarily subject its custody, at all times, to his own individual
will. This is the argument.

It is true, that the appointment of all public officers, with some
exceptions, is, by the Constitution, given to the President, with the
consent of the Senate; and as, in most cases, public property must be
held by some officer, its keepers will generally be persons so
appointed. But this is only the common, not a necessary consequence, of
giving the appointing power to the President and Senate. Congress may
still, if it shall so see fit, place the public treasure in the hand of
no officer appointed by the President, or removable by him, but in hands
quite beyond his control. Subject to one contingency only, it did this
very thing by the charter of the present bank; and it did the same thing
absolutely, and subject to no contingency, by the law of 1800. The
Protest, in the first place, seizes on the fact that all officers must
be appointed by the President, or on his nomination; it then assumes the
next step, that all officers are, and _must be_, removable at his
pleasure; and then, insisting that public money, like other public
property, must be kept by _some public officer_, it thus arrives at the
conclusion that it _must_ always be in the hands of those who are
appo