e same terms upon which they are conferred upon other
citizens; and unless he is so entitled he can not, in the
proper sense of the term, be a citizen.

In the case of Scott _vs._ Sanford (19 How. 404), Chief-Justice
Taney says:

The words "people of the United States," and "citizens," are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing; they describe the
political body, who according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty and hold the power, and
conduct the government through their representatives. They
are what we familiarly call the sovereign people, and every
citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of
this sovereignty.

Mr. Justice Daniel, in the same case (p. 476), says:

Upon the principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as
derived from _civitas_, conveys the idea of connection or
identification with the State or Government, and a
participation in its functions. But beyond this, there is
not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of writers
on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried,
an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been
understood as conferring the actual possession and
enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment
of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political.

Similar references might be made to an indefinite extent, but
enough has been said to show that the term citizen, in the
language of Justice Daniel, conveys the idea "of identification
with the State or Government, and a participation in its
functions." Beyond question, therefore, the first section of the
XIV. Amendment, by placing the citizenship of women upon a par
with that of men, and declaring that the "privileges and
immunities" of the citizen shall not be abridged, has secured to
women, equally with men, the right of suffrage, unless that
conclusion is overthrown by some other provision of the
Constitution.

It is not necessary for the purposes of this argument to claim
that this Amendment prohibits a State from making or enforcing
any law whatever, regulating the elective franchise, or
prescribing the conditions upon which it may be exercised. But we
do cl