d
States, on the 18th day of June last. Upon that trial the facts
of voting by your petitioner, and that she was a woman, were not
denied; nor was it claimed on the part of the Government than
your petitioner lacked any of the qualifications of a voter,
unless disqualified by reason of her sex. It was shown on behalf
of your petitioner, on the trial, that before voting she called
upon a respectable lawyer and asked his opinion whether she had a
right to vote, and he advised her that she had such right, and
the lawyer was examined as a witness in her behalf, and testified
that he gave her such advice, and that he gave it in good faith,
believing that she had such right. It also appeared that when
she offered to vote, the question whether, as a woman, she had a
right to vote, was raised by the inspectors, and considered by
them in her presence, and they decided that she had a right to
vote, and received her vote accordingly.

It was shown on the part of the Government that, on the
examination of your petitioner before the commissioner on whose
warrant she was arrested, your petitioner stated that she should
have voted if allowed to vote, without reference to the advice of
the attorney whose opinion she asked; that she was not induced to
vote by that opinion; that she had before determined to offer her
vote, and had no doubt about her right to vote. At the close of
the testimony, your petitioner's counsel proceeded to address the
jury, and stated that he desired to present for consideration
three propositions, two of law, and one of fact: 1. That your
petitioner had a lawful right to vote. 2. That whether she had a
right to vote or not, if she honestly believed that she had that
right, and voted in good faith in that belief, she was guilty of
no crime. 3. That when your petitioner gave her vote she gave it
in good faith, believing that it was her right to do so.

That the two first propositions presented questions for the court
to decide, and the last question for the jury. When your
petitioner's counsel had proceeded thus far, the judge suggested
that the counsel had better discuss, in the first place, the
questions of law, which the counsel proceeded to do; and, having
discussed the two legal questions at length, asked then to say a
few