in a jury trial, at the bar of the
Supreme Court, and expressed the unanimous opinion of the judges
of that court, and that, too, in a civil cause. The decision in
Georgia _vs._ Brailsford has never been expressly overruled by
that court; although the practice in civil causes is for the
court to direct a verdict where there is no conflict in regard to
the testimony. In Beavans _vs._ The United States, 13 Wall, 56,
which was an action _ex contractu_, on a receiver's bond, the
court says:
The objection that the jury was instructed to find for the
plaintiffs the amount claimed by the papers given in
evidence (viz, the official settlements), with interest
thereon, is entirely without merit. There was no evidence to
impeach the accounts stated, or to show set-off, release, or
payment. The instruction was, therefore, in accordance with
the legal effect of the evidence, and there were no disputed
facts upon which the jury could pass.
An act of Congress declares that the papers of official
settlement shall be _prima facie_ evidence of the condition of
the accounts. No testimony was offered in this case to impeach
that statement. There was, therefore, no fact in issue; and the
instruction of the court to find a verdict for the plaintiff was,
in substance, ruling upon matters of law only. And the Supreme
Court, in their opinion, recognize, and merely recognize, the
practice which now obtains universally in the trial of civil
causes. And, although it is inconsistent with Georgia _vs._
Brailsford, and substantially overrules it, it does not impair
the value of the decision in that case, as showing the
understanding of the profession and the courts about the time of
the adoption of the Constitution.
In United States _vs._ Wilson (1 Bald., 108), the jury were
instructed as follows:
We have thus stated to you the law of this case under the
solemn duties and obligations imposed on us, under the clear
conviction that in doing so we have presented to you the
true test by which you will apply the evidence to the case;
but you will distinctly understand that you are the judges
both of the law and the fact in a criminal case, and are not
bound by the opinion of the court.
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