clauses, but in neither is there a
word as to the sex of the elector. He, or she, must be one of the
people, or "citizens," as they are designated in the
Constitution, that is all.--(Story's Comms. Sec. 579.)
The "people" are to elect. This clause fixes the class of voters;
the other clause is in subordination to that, and merely
provides, that as touching qualifications, there shall be one and
the same standard for the Federal and for the State elector. Both
are mentioned and neither is or can be excluded by the other.
The right to vote is very different from the qualification
necessary in a voter. A person may have the right to vote, and
yet not possess the necessary qualifications for exercising it.
In this case, the right to vote is derived from the Federal
Constitution, which designates the class of persons who may
exercise it, and provides that the Federal elector shall conform
to the regulations of the State, so far as time, place, and
manner of exercising it are concerned. But it is clear that under
this authority the State has no right to lay down an arbitrary
and impossible rule. As before stated by the Chief-Justice of
Nevada: "To make the enjoyment of a right depend upon an
impossible condition, is equivalent to an absolute denial of it
under any condition."
In conclusion, we will consider, as briefly as possible, the
points made by the Supreme Court of Missouri. We quote from the
opinion:
The question presented then is, whether there is a conflict
between the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri on this
subject. That the different States of the Union had a right,
previous to the adoption of what is known as the XIV.
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to limit
the right to vote at election by their constitutions and
laws to the male sex, I think can not at this day be
questioned.
Undoubtedly the practice in the different States, as we have
before said, is against the claim made by the plaintiff,
although, as we shall show, in the early days of the Republic
this practice was by no means universal. But when the Court
states that the right of the States to do this can not be
questioned, it assum
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