e no more judges of the law in
a criminal case upon the plea of not guilty than they are in
every civil case tried upon the general issue. In each of
these cases their verdict, when general, is necessarily
compounded of law and of fact, and includes both. In each
they must necessarily determine the law as well as the fact.
In each they have the physical power to disregard the law as
laid down to them by the court. But I deny that in any case,
civil or criminal, they have the moral right to decide the
law according to their own notions or pleasure.

In Commonwealth _vs._ Porter, 10 Met., decided in 1845, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts followed the decision in
Battiste's case, and held that the jury are under a moral
obligation to decide the case as instructed by the court, and the
court sum up the subject as follows:

On the whole subject, the views of the court may be
summarily expressed in the following propositions: That in
all criminal cases it is competent for the jury, if they see
fit, to decide upon all questions of fact embraced in the
issue, and to refer the law arising thereon to the court in
the form of a special verdict. But it is optional with the
jury thus to return a special verdict or not, and it is
within their legitimate province and power to return a
general verdict if they see fit. In thus rendering a general
verdict, the jury must necessarily pass upon the whole
issue, compounded of the law and of the fact, and they may
thus incidentally pass on questions of law.

The opinion in this case was delivered by Chief-Justice Shaw, and
is rather a discussion of what is a convenient distribution of
powers between the court and jury than an examination into the
actual state of the law; and he neither cites nor refers to a
single authority from the beginning to the end of the opinion.
Again, the conclusions arrived at by the opinion admit the power
of the jury to decide questions of law; and that, in cases where
the jury acquit the defendant, there is no power to reverse or
even to review the finding of the jury. And this opinion holds
that the defendant, in all criminal cases, is entitled to address
the jury upon the