e had such right.

It also appeared that when she offered to vote, the question
whether as a woman she had a right to vote, was raised by the
inspectors, and considered by them in her presence, and they
decided that she had a right to vote, and received her vote
accordingly.

It was also shown on the part of the Government, that on the
examination of the defendant before the commissioner on whose
warrant she was arrested, she stated that she should have voted,
if allowed to vote, without reference to the advice she had
received from the attorney whose opinion she had asked; that she
was not influenced to vote by that opinion; that she had before
determined to offer her vote, and had no doubt about her right to
vote.

At the close of the testimony the defendant's counsel proceeded
to address the jury, and stated that he desired to present for
consideration three propositions, two of law and one of fact:

First.--That the defendant had a lawful right to vote.

Second.--That whether she had a lawful right to vote or not, if
she honestly believed that she had that right and voted in good
faith in that belief, she was guilty of no crime.

Third.--That when she gave her vote she gave it in good faith,
believing that it was her right to do so.

That the first two propositions presented questions for the Court
to decide, and the last for the jury.

When the counsel had proceeded thus far, the Court suggested that
the counsel had better discuss in the first place the questions
of law; which the counsel proceeded to do, and having discussed
the two legal questions at length, asked leave then to say a few
words to the jury on the question of fact. The Court then said to
the counsel that he thought that had better be left until the
views of the Court upon the legal question should be made known.

The District Attorney thereupon addressed the Court at length
upon the legal questions, and at the close of his argument the
Court delivered an opinion adverse to the positions of the
defendant's counsel upon both of the legal questions presented,
holding that the defendant was not entitled to vote; and that if
she voted in good faith in the belief in fact that she had a
right to vote, it would constitute no defense--the grounds of the
d