of criminal law, nor with the
most ordinary rules of justice. Such a ruling can not but shock
the moral sense of all right-minded, unprejudiced men.

No doubt the assumption by the defendant of a belief of her right
to vote might be made use of by her as a mere cover to secure the
privilege of giving a known illegal vote, and of course that
false assumption would constitute no defense to the charge of
illegal voting. If the defendant had dressed herself in male
attire, and had voted as John Anthony, instead of Susan, she
would not be able to protect herself against a charge of voting
with a knowledge that she had no right to vote, by asserting her
belief that she had a right to vote as a woman. The artifice
would no doubt effectually overthrow the assertion of good faith.
No such question, however, is made here. The decision of which I
complain concedes that the defendant voted in good faith, in the
most implicit belief that she had a right to vote, and condemns
her on the strength of the legal fiction, conceded to be in fact
a mere fiction, that she knew the contrary. But if the facts
admitted of a doubt of the defendant's good faith, that was a
question for the jury, and it was clear error for the court to
assume the decision of it.

Again. The denial of the right to poll the jury was most clearly
an error. Under the provisions of the Constitution which have
been cited, the defendant could only be convicted on the verdict
of a jury. The case of Cancemi shows that such jury must consist
of twelve men; and it will not be claimed that anything less than
the unanimous voice of the jury can be received as their verdict.
How then could the defendant be lawfully deprived of the right to
ask every juror if the verdict had his assent? I believe this is
a right which was never before denied to a party against whom a
verdict was rendered in any case, either civil or criminal. The
following cases show, and many others might be cited to the same
effect, that the right to poll the jury is an absolute right in
all cases, civil and criminal. (The People _vs._ Perkins, 1
Wend., 91; Jackson _vs._ Hawks, 2 Wend., 619; Fox _vs._ Smith, 3
Cowen, 23.)

The ground on which the right of the defendant to vote has been
denied, is, as I understood the decision