573; The State _vs._
McDonald, 4 Harrington, 555; The State _vs._ Homes, 17 Mo.,
379; Rex _vs._ Hall, 3 C. & P., 409 (S. C. 14 Eng., C. L.);
The Queen _vs._ Reed, 1 C. &. M., 306 (S. C. 41 Eng., C.
L.); Lancaster's Case, 3 Leon, 208; Starkie on Ev., Part
IV., Vol. 2, p. 828, 3d Am. Ed.]

The counsel then said, there are some cases which I concede can
not be reconciled with the position which I have endeavored to
maintain, and I am sorry to say that one of them is found in the
reports of this State. As the cases are referred to in that, and
the principle, if they can be said to stand on any principle, is
in all of them the same, it will only be incumbent on me to
notice that one. That case is not only irreconcilable with the
numerous authorities and the fundamental principles of criminal
law to which I have referred, but the enormity of its injustice
is sufficient alone to condemn it. I refer to the case of
Hamilton _vs._ The People (57 Barb., 725). In that case Hamilton
had been convicted of a misdemeanor, in having voted at a general
election, after having been previously convicted of a felony, and
sentenced to two years imprisonment in the State prison, and not
having been pardoned; the conviction having by law deprived him
of citizenship and right to vote, unless pardoned and restored to
citizenship. The case came up before the General Term of the
Supreme Court, on writ of error. It appeared that on the trial
evidence was offered, that before the prisoner was discharged
from the State prison, he and his father applied to the Governor
for a pardon, and that the Governor replied in writing, that on
the ground of the prisoner's being a minor at the time of his
discharge from prison, a pardon would not be necessary, and that
he would be entitled to all the rights of a citizen on his coming
of age. They also applied to two respectable counselors of the
Supreme Court, and they confirmed the Governor's opinion. All
this evidence was rejected. It appeared that the prisoner was
seventeen years old when convicted of the felony, and was
nineteen when discharged from prison. The rejection of the
evidence was approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that the
prisoner was bound to know the law, and was presumed to do so,