ges passed
upon that question. The XIV. Amendment gives no right to a woman
to vote, and the voting by Miss Anthony was in violation of the
law.

If she believed she had a right to vote, and voted in reliance
upon that belief, does that relieve her from the penalty? It is
argued that the knowledge referred to in the act relates to her
knowledge of the illegality of the act, and not to the act of
voting; for it is said that she must know that she voted. Two
principles apply here: First, ignorance of the law excuses no
one; second, every person is presumed to understand and to intend
the necessary effects of his own acts. Miss Anthony knew that she
was a woman, and that the Constitution of this State prohibits
her from voting. She intended to violate that provision--intended
to test it, perhaps, but certainly intended to violate it. The
necessary effect of her act was to violate it, and this she is
presumed to have intended. There was no ignorance of any fact,
but all the facts being known, she undertook to settle a
principle in her own person. She takes the risk, and she can not
escape the consequences. It is said, and authorities are cited to
sustain the position, that there can be no crime unless there is
a culpable intent; to render one criminally responsible a vicious
will must be present. A. commits a trespass on the land of B.,
and B., thinking and believing that he has a right to shoot an
intruder on his premises, kills A. on the spot. Does B.'s
misapprehension of his rights justify his act? Would a Judge be
justified in charging the jury that if satisfied that B. supposed
he had a right to shoot A he was justified, and they should find
a verdict of not guilty? No Judge would make such a charge. To
constitute a crime, it is true that there must be a criminal
intent, but it is equally true that knowledge of the facts of the
case is always held to supply this intent. An intentional killing
bears with it evidence of malice in law. Whoever, without
justifiable cause, intentionally kills his neighbor, is guilty of
a crime. The principle is the same in the case before us, and in
all criminal cases. The precise question now before me has been
several times decided, viz: That one illegally voting was bound
and was assumed to know the law,