e word "knowingly." (2
Id. Sec. 172.)

As to a presumed knowledge of the law, where the fact involves a
question of law, the same author says:

The general doctrine laid down in the foregoing sections
(_i.e._, that every man is presumed to know the law, and
that ignorance of the law does not excuse), is plain in
itself and plain in its application. Still, there are cases,
the precise nature and extent of which are not so obvious,
wherein ignorance of the law constitutes, in a sort of
indirect way, not in itself a defense, but a foundation on
which another defense rests. Thus, if the guilt or innocence
of a prisoner depends on the fact to be found by the jury,
of his having been or not, when he did the act, in some
precise mental condition, which mental condition is the gist
of the offense, the jury in determining this question of
mental condition, may take into consideration his ignorance
or misinformation in a matter of law. For example, to
constitute larceny, there must be an intent to steal, which
involves the knowledge that the property taken does not
belong to the taker; yet, if all the facts concerning the
title are known to the accused, and so the question is one
merely of law whether the property is his or not; still he
may show, and the showing will be a defense to him against
the criminal proceeding, that he honestly believed it his
through a misapprehension of the law.

The conclusions of the writer here are correct, but in a part of
the statement the learned author has thrown some obscurity over
his own principles. The doctrines elsewhere enunciated by him,
show with great clearness, that in such cases the state of the
mind constitutes the essence of the offense, and if the state of
the mind which the law condemns does not exist, in connection
with the act, there is no offense. It is immaterial whether its
non-existence be owing to ignorance of law or ignorance of fact,
in either case the fact which the law condemns, the criminal
intent, is wanting. It is not, therefore, in an "indirect way,"
that ignorance of the law in such cases constitutes a defense,
but in the most direct way possible. It is not a fact whi