FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   417   418   419   420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441  
442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453   454   455   456   457   458   459   460   461   462   463   464   465   466   >>   >|  
rrow selfishness. For while each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this must necessarily produce an oppositon of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but be dangerous to the new-established union. It is however worth while to remark, that this contrariety of passions would be attended with but small danger, did it not concur with a peculiarity in our outward circumstances, which affords it an opportunity of exerting itself. There are different species of goods, which we are possessed of; the internal satisfaction of our minds, the external advantages of our body, and the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquired by our industry and good fortune. We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first. The second may be ravished from us, but can be of no advantage to him who deprives us of them. The last only are both exposed to the violence of others, and may be transferred without suffering any loss or alteration; while at the same time, there is not a sufficient quantity of them to supply every one's desires and necessities. As the improvement, therefore, of these goods is the chief advantage of society, so the instability of their possession, along with their scarcity, is the chief impediment. In vain should we expect to find, in uncultivated nature, a remedy to this inconvenience; or hope for any inartificial principle of the human mind, which might controul those partial affections, and make us overcome the temptations arising from our circumstances. The idea of justice can never serve to this purpose, or be taken for a natural principle, capable of inspiring men with an equitable conduct towards each other. That virtue, as it is now understood, would never have been dreamed of among rude and savage men. For the notion of injury or injustice implies an immorality or vice committed against some other person: And as every immorality is derived from some defect or unsoundness of the passions, and as this defect must be judged of, in a great measure, from the ordinary course of nature in the constitution of the mind; it will be easy to know, whether we be guilty of any immorality, with regard to others, by considering the natural, and usual force of those several affections, which are directed towards them. Now it appears, that in the original frame of our mind, our strong
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   417   418   419   420   421   422   423   424   425   426   427   428   429   430   431   432   433   434   435   436   437   438   439   440   441  
442   443   444   445   446   447   448   449   450   451   452   453   454   455   456   457   458   459   460   461   462   463   464   465   466   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

immorality

 

passions

 

person

 
natural
 

affections

 
circumstances
 

advantage

 
enjoyment
 

nature

 
defect

principle

 
temptations
 
possession
 
overcome
 

arising

 
society
 

justice

 

instability

 

impediment

 
controul

remedy

 

uncultivated

 
inconvenience
 

inartificial

 

partial

 

scarcity

 

expect

 

constitution

 

judged

 

measure


ordinary

 

guilty

 

regard

 
appears
 

original

 

strong

 
directed
 

unsoundness

 
derived
 

virtue


understood

 
conduct
 

capable

 
inspiring
 

equitable

 

dreamed

 
committed
 

implies

 

injustice

 

savage