ns. A regard to this merit is, therefore,
a secondary consideration, and derived from the antecedent principle of
humanity, which is meritorious and laudable.
In short, it may be established as an undoubted maxim, THAT NO ACTION
CAN BE VIRTUOUS, OR MORALLY GOOD, UNLESS THERE BE IN HUMAN NATURE SOME
MOTIVE TO PRODUCE IT, DISTINCT FROM THE SENSE OF ITS MORALITY.
But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any
other motive? I answer, It may: But this is no objection to the present
doctrine. When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human
nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate
himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the
motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice,
that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much
as possible, his want of it. A man that really feels no gratitude in his
temper, is still pleased to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has,
by that means, fulfilled his duty. Actions are at first only considered
as signs of motives: But it is usual, in this case, as in all others, to
fix our attention on the signs, and neglect, in some measure, the thing
signifyed. But though, on some occasions, a person may perform an action
merely out of regard to its moral obligation, yet still this supposes
in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing
the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious.
Now to apply all this to the present case; I suppose a person to have
lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be restored in a few days;
and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term agreed on, he
demands the sum: I ask, What reason or motive have I to restore the
money? It will, perhaps, be said, that my regard to justice, and
abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reasons for me, if
I have the least grain of honesty, or sense of duty and obligation. And
this answer, no doubt, is just and satisfactory to man in his civilized
state, and when trained up according to a certain discipline and
education. But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are
pleased to call such a condition natural, this answer would be rejected
as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical. For one in that situation
would immediately ask you, WHEREIN CONSISTS THIS HONESTY AND JUSTICE,
WHICH YOU FIND IN RESTORING A LOAN, AND ABSTAINING FROM TH
|