g polished
up by me with a good deal of care.

I have been waiting to see it a long time, Varro, said I, but still I have
not ventured to ask for it. For I heard from our friend Libo, with whose
zeal you are well acquainted, (for I can never conceal anything of that
kind,) that you have not been slackening in the business, but are
expending a great deal of care on it, and in fact never put it out of your
hands. But it has never hitherto come into my mind to ask you about it;
however now, since I have begun to commit to a durable record those things
which I learnt in your company, and to illustrate in the Latin language
that ancient philosophy which originated with Socrates, I must ask you why
it is that, while you write on so many subjects, you pass over this one,
especially when you yourself are very eminent in it; and when that study,
and indeed the whole subject, is far superior in importance to all other
studies and arts.

II. You are asking me, he replied, about a matter on which I have often
deliberated and frequently revolved in my mind. And, therefore, I will
answer you without any hesitation; still, however, speaking quite
off-hand, because I have, as I said just now, thought over the subject
both deeply and frequently. For as I saw that philosophy had been
explained with great care in the Greek language, I thought that if any of
our countrymen were engrossed by the study of it, who were well versed in
Greek literature, they would be more likely to read Greek treatises than
Latin ones: but that those men who were averse to Greek science and to the
schools of the Greek philosophers would not care the least for such
matters as these, which could not be understood at all without some
acquaintance with Greek literature. And, therefore, I did not choose to
write treatises which unlearned men could not understand, and learned men
would not be at the trouble of reading. And you yourself are aware of
this. For you have learnt that we cannot resemble Amafanius(4) or
Rabirius,(5) who without any art discuss matters which come before the
eyes of every one in plain ordinary language, giving no accurate
definitions, making no divisions, drawing no inferences by well-directed
questions, and who appear to think that there is no such thing as any art
of speaking or disputing. But we, in obedience to the precepts of the
logicians and of orators also, as if they were positive laws, (since our
countrymen consider skill in each o