dded not so much to nature as to a happy life. They
thought that a man was as it were a certain part of the state, and of the
whole human race, and that he was connected with other men by a sort of
human society. And this is the way in which they deal with the chief and
natural good. But they think that everything else is connected with it,
either in the way of increasing or of maintaining it; as riches, power,
glory, and influence. And thus a threefold division of goods is inferred
by them.
VI. And these are those three kinds which most people believe the
Peripatetics speak of: and so far they are not wrong; for this division is
the work of that school. But they are mistaken if they think that the
Academicians--those at least who bore this name at that time--are different
from the Peripatetics. The principle, and the chief good asserted by both
appeared to be the same--namely, to attain those things which were in the
first class by nature, and which were intrinsically desirable; the whole
of them, if possible, or, at all events, the most important of them. But
those are the most important which exist in the mind itself, and are
conversant about virtue itself. Therefore, all that ancient philosophy
perceived that a happy life was placed in virtue alone; and yet that it
was not the happiest life possible, unless the good qualities of the body
were added to it, and all the other things which have been already
mentioned, which are serviceable towards acquiring a habit of virtue. From
this definition of theirs, a certain principle of action in life, and of
duty itself, was discovered, which consisted in the preservation of those
things which nature might prescribe. Hence arose the avoidance of sloth,
and contempt of pleasures; from which proceeded the willingness to
encounter many and great labours and pains, for the sake of what was right
and honourable, and of those things which are conformable to the objects
of nature. Hence was generated friendship, and justice, and equity; and
these things were preferred to pleasure and to many of the advantages of
life. This was the system of morals recommended in their school, and the
method and design of that division which I have placed first.
But concerning nature (for that came next), they spoke in such a manner
that they divided it into two parts,--making one efficient, and the other
lending itself, as it were, to the first, as subject matter to be worked
upon. For that part w
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