er and my household gods, that I am
inflamed with a desire of discovering the truth, and that I do truly feel
what I say. For how can I avoid wishing to discover the truth, when I
rejoice if I have discovered anything resembling the truth? But although I
consider to see the truth a most beautiful thing, so also do I think it a
most disgraceful one to approve of what is false as if it were true. Not,
indeed, that I am myself a man who never approve of anything false, who
never give assent to any such thing, and am never guided by opinion; but
we are speaking of a wise man. But I myself am very apt to adopt opinions,
for I am not a wise man, and I direct my thoughts, steering not to that
little Cynosura,
The nightly star, which shining not in vain,
Guides the Phoenician sailor o'er the main,
as Aratus says;--and those mariners steer in a more direct course because
they keep looking at the constellation,
Which in its inner course and orbit brief
Surely revolves;--
but looking rather towards Helice, and the bright north star, that is to
say, to these reasons of a more expansive kind, not polished away to a
point; and therefore I roam and wander about in a freer course. However,
the question, as I said just now, is not about myself, but about a wise
man. For when these perceptions have made a violent impression on the
intellect and senses, I admit them, and sometimes I even assent to them,
but still I do not perceive them: for I do not think that anything can be
perceived. I am not a wise man, therefore I submit to perceptions and
cannot resist them: but Arcesilas, being on this point in agreement with
Zeno, thinks that this is the most important part of the power of a wise
man, that he can guard against being entangled, and provide against being
deceived. For there is nothing more incompatible with the idea which we
have of the gravity of a wise man than error, levity, and temerity. Why,
then, need I speak of the firmness of a wise man? whom even you too,
Lucullus, admit to be never guided by mere opinion. And since this is
sanctioned by you, (if I am dealing irregularly with you at this moment, I
will soon return to the proper order of your arguments,) just consider
what force this first conclusion has.
XXI. If the wise man ever assents to anything, he will likewise sometimes
form opinions: but he never will form opinions: therefore he will never
assent to anything. This conclusion was app
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