ilius Geminus, if he thought that he
saw Quintus, fell into a perception of that kind that could not be
perceived; because what was true was distinguished by no characteristic
mark from what was false: and if this distinctive mark were taken away,
what characteristic of the same kind could he have by which to recognise
Caius Cotta, who was twice consul with Geminus, which could not possibly
be false? You say that such a likeness as that is not in the nature of
things. You fight the question vigorously, but you are fighting a
peaceably disposed adversary. Grant, then, that it is not; at all events,
it is possible that it should seem to be so; therefore it will deceive the
senses. And if one likeness deceives them, it will have made everything
doubtful; for when that judgment is once taken away by which alone things
can be known, then, even if the person whom you see, be really the person
whom he appears to you to be, still you will not judge by that
characteristic which you say you ought, being of such a character that one
of the same kind cannot be false. If, therefore, it is possible that
Publius Geminus may appear to you to be Quintus, what certainty have you
that he may not appear to you to be Cotta though he is not, since some
things do appear to you to be what they are not? You say that everything
has its own peculiar genus; that there is nothing the same as something
else. That is a stoic doctrine, and one not very credible, for they say
that there is not a single hair or a single grain in every respect like
another hair or grain. These things could all be refuted, but I do not
wish to be contentious; for it has nothing in the world to do with the
question whether the things which are seen do not differ at all in any
part, or whether they cannot be distinguished from another even though
they do differ. But, granting that there cannot be such a likeness between
men, can there not be such between statues? Tell me, could not Lysippus,
using the same brass, the same composition of metals, the same atmosphere,
water, and all other appliances, have made a hundred Alexanders exactly
alike? How then could you distinguish between them? Again; if I, with this
ring, make a hundred impressions on the same piece of wax, is it possible
that there should be any difference to enable you to distinguish one from
the other?--or, shall you have to seek out some ring engraver, since you
have already found us a Delian poulterer who could
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