ons of the mind? and if you take these away, how are you to
distinguish the artist from the ignorant man? For we must not say at
random that this man is an artist, and deny that that man is; but we must
only do so when we see that the one retains the things which he has
perceived and comprehended, and that the other does not. And as some arts
are of that kind that one can only see the fact in one's mind, others such
that one can design and effect something, how can a geometrician perceive
those things which have no existence, or which cannot be distinguished
from what is false? or how can he who plays on the lyre complete his
rhythm, and finish verses? And the same will be the case with respect to
similar arts, whose whole work consists in acting and in effecting
something. For what is there that can be effected by art, unless the man
who exercises the art has many perceptions?

VIII. And most especially does the knowledge of virtues confirm the
assertion that many things can be perceived and comprehended. And in those
things alone do we say that science exists; which we consider to be not a
mere comprehension of things, but one that is firm and unchangeable; and
we consider it also to be wisdom, the art of living which, by itself,
derives consistency from itself. But if that consistency has no perception
or knowledge about it, then I ask whence it has originated and how? I ask
also, why that good man who has made up his mind to endure every kind of
torture, to be torn by intolerable pain, rather than to betray his duty or
his faith, has imposed on himself such bitter conditions, when he has
nothing comprehended, perceived, known, or established, to lead him to
think that he is bound to do so? It cannot, then, by any possibility be
the case that any one should estimate equity and good faith so highly as
to shrink from no punishment for the sake of preserving them, unless he
has assented to those facts which cannot be false. But as to wisdom
itself, if it be ignorant of its own character, and if it does not know
whether it be wisdom or not, in the first place, how is it to obtain its
name of wisdom? Secondly, how will it venture to undertake any exploit, or
to perform it with confidence, when it has nothing certain to follow? But
when it doubts what is the chief and highest good, being ignorant to what
everything is referred, how can it be wisdom?

And that also is manifest, that it is necessary that there should be laid