hy consisted in it: for
that the fixing of what is true and false, known and unknown, is the
supreme law of all philosophy. And since they adopted this principle, and
wished to teach what ought to be received by each individual, and what
rejected, undoubtedly, said he, they ought to perceive this very thing
from which the whole judgment of what is true and false arises. He urged,
in short, that there were these two principal objects in philosophy, the
knowledge of truth, and the attainment of the chief good; and that a man
could not be wise who was ignorant of either the beginning of knowledge,
or of the end of desire, so as not to know either where to start from, or
whither to seek to arrive at. But that to feel in doubt on these points,
and not to have such confidence respecting them as to be unable to be
shaken, is utterly incompatible with wisdom.
In this manner, therefore, it was more fitting to demand of them that they
should at least admit that this fact was perceived, namely, that nothing
could be perceived. But enough, I imagine, has been said of the
inconsistency of their whole opinion, if, indeed, you can say that a man
who approves of nothing has any opinion at all.
X. The next point for discussion is one which is copious enough, but
rather abstruse; for it touches in some points on natural philosophy, so
that I am afraid that I may be giving the man who will reply to me too
much liberty and licence. For what can I think that he will do about
abstruse and obscure matters, who seeks to deprive us of all light? But
one might argue with great refinement the question,--with how much
artificial skill, as it were, nature has made, first of all, every animal;
secondly, man most especially;--how great the power of the senses is; in
what manner things seen first affect us; then, how the desires, moved by
these things, followed; and, lastly, in what manner we direct our senses
to the perception of things. For the mind itself, which is the source of
the senses, and which itself is sense, has a natural power, which it
directs towards those things by which it is moved. Therefore it seizes on
other things which are seen in such a manner as to use them at once;
others it stores up; and from these memory arises: but all other things it
arranges by similitudes, from which notions of things are engendered;
which the Greeks call, at one time {~GREEK SMALL LETTER EPSILON WITH PSILI AND OXIA~}{~GREEK SMALL LETTER NU~}{~GREEK SM
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