ween them. Let us, then, now deal
with those who draw this distinction, and let us abandon, as incurable and
desperate, those who say that everything is as uncertain as whether the
number of the stars be odd or even. For they contend, (and I noticed that
you were especially moved by this,) that there is something probable, and,
as I may say, likely; and that they adopt that likelihood as a rule in
steering their course of life, and in making inquiries and conducting
discussions.

XI. But what rule can there be, if we have no notion whatever of true or
false, because it is impossible to distinguish one from the other? For, if
we have such a notion, then there must be a difference between what is
true and what is false, as there is between what is right and what is
wrong. If there is no difference, then there is no rule; nor can a man to
whom what is true and what is false appear under one common aspect, have
any means of judging of, or any mark at all by which he can know the
truth. For when they say, that they take away nothing but the idea of
anything being able to appear in such a manner that it cannot possibly
appear false in the same manner but that they admit everything else, they
are acting childishly. For though they have taken away that by which
everything is judged of, they deny that they take away the rest; just as
if a person were to deprive a man of his eyes, and then say that he has
not taken away from him those things which can be seen. For just as those
things are known by the eyes, so are the other things known by the
perceptions; but by a mark belonging peculiarly to truth, and not common
to what is true and false.

Wherefore, whether you bring forward a perception which is merely
probable, or one which is at once probable and free from all hindrance, as
Carneades contended, or anything else that you may follow, you will still
have to return to that perception of which we are treating. But in it, if
there be but one common characteristic of what is false and true, there
will be no judgment possible, because nothing peculiar can be noted in one
sign common to two things: but if there be no such community, then I have
got what I want; for I am seeking what appears to me to be so true, that
it cannot possibly appear false.

They are equally mistaken when, being convicted and overpowered by the
force of truth, they wish to distinguish between what is evident and what
is perceived, and endeavour to prove t