providence watching over everything subject to its
dominion, and, above all, over the heavenly bodies; and, next to them,
over those things on earth which concern men: which also they sometimes
call necessity, because nothing can be done in a manner different from
that in which it has been arranged by it in a destined (if I may so say)
and inevitable continuation of eternal order. Sometimes, too, they call it
fortune, because it brings about many unforeseen things, which have never
been expected by us, on account of the obscurity of their causes, and our
ignorance of them.
VIII. The third part of philosophy, which is next in order, being
conversant about reason and discussion, was thus handled by both schools.
They said that, although it originated in the senses, still the power of
judging of the truth was not in the senses. They insisted upon it that
intellect was the judge of things. They thought that the only thing
deserving of belief, because it alone discerned that which was always
simple and uniform, and which perceived its real character. This they call
_idea_, having already received this name from Plato; and we properly
entitle it _species_.
But they thought that all the senses were dull and slow, and that they did
not by any means perceive those things which appeared subjected to the
senses; which were either so small as to be unable to come under the
notice of sense, or so moveable and rapid that none of them was ever one
consistent thing, nor even the same thing, because everything was in a
continual state of transition and disappearance. And therefore they called
all this division of things one resting wholly on opinion. But they
thought that science had no existence anywhere except in the notions and
reasonings of the mind; on which account they approved of the definitions
of things, and employed them on everything which was brought under
discussion. The explanation of words also was approved of--that is to say,
the explanation of the cause why everything was named as it was; and that
they called etymology. Afterwards they used arguments, and, as it were,
marks of things, for the proof and conclusion of what they wished to have
explained; in which the whole system of dialectics--that is to say, of an
oration brought to its conclusion by ratiocination, was handed down. And
to this there was added, as a kind of second part, the oratorical power of
speaking, which consists in developing a continued discour
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