ole which is potential, divided into
virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms,
except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have
an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as
whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to
be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and,
therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally
divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a
soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally
related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided
accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative
totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or
accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on
logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs
to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the
principle of operation.

Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole
surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If
we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then
the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to
be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the
whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a
small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence,
then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither
essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say
that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of
perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not
in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with
regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is
in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the
soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the
same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared
primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate
perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are
ordained to the whole.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power
of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its
primary and proportionate