e matter is in the soul.
Obj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their
existence, as the Philosopher says _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6). But
the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.
Therefore the soul has matter.
Obj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure
act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the
soul has matter.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that
the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual
matter.
_I answer that,_ The soul has no matter. We may consider this question
in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it
belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either
it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of
some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it
is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we
understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act;
and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since
potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,
however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that
part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the
"primary animate."
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul
inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is
received into something is received according to the condition of the
recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the
knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature
absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and
therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal
idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul
itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and
form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form,
the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so
it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the
sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since
matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows,
therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual
substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from
composition of matter and form.
Reply Obj. 1: The
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