ectual soul
exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting;
thence it gathers the "difference" of man.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 4]
Whether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?
Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides
the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that
"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially."
Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body
has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other
substantial form in the body precedes the soul.
Obj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now
everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one
moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,
5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part
must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved
(Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything
that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there
must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.
Obj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to
primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to some
beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial
form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately
to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most
imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.
Obj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does
not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere
corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a
mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human
body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.
_On the contrary,_ Of one thing there is but one substantial being.
But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one
thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the
substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be
in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.
_I answer that,_ If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not
united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the
Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there
is another substantial for
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