Q. 76, Art. 1]

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?

Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to
the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that
the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body.
Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature
of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would
be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were
united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate
nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature;
and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear
from what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the
nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to
the body as its form.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body,
receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must
be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form
of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially
and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise
the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and
universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore
the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same
subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is
not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. 75, A. 2).
Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body.
But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the
essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither
is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.

Obj. 5: Further, whatever has _per se_ existence is not united to the
body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so
that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by
itself. But the intellectual principle has _per se_ existence and is
subsistent, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore it is not
united to the body as its form.

Obj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature
exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form
by reason of its nature; because form i