other, except by
something outside the essence of each. The distinction between
Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a
tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.
It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the
opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the
intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.
For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,
as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is
the principle of existence.
Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the
manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is
manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two
instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but
several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two
hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the
contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we
might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if
there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many
drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and
one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when
the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one
stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or
coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all
the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey
the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two
men to have several intellects and one sense--for instance, if two
men had one eye--there would be several seers, but one sight. But if
there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things
of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it
possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one
understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is
the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the
intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent
and one action: that is to say that all men are but one
"understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard,
that is, of one intelligible object.
However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action
from yours by the distinction of t
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