ilds, because it is
accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates
or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him
accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated
of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates
understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding
that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of
Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 4),
for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious
both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense
without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It
follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is
a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of
Socrates.
The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible
species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and
in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the
intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of
this or that particular man. But this link or union does not
sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the
act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the
sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things
relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the
intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he
says _De Anima_ iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in
the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect.
Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in
the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to
the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is
seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in
the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are
the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are
understood.
Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the
body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one
thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the
whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the
intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the
movement of which presupposes the operation of the intel
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