t man may be able to understand all things by
means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand
immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the
intellectual power be not the act of the body.

Reply Obj. 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a
form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore
there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of
the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it
subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual
soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the
whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the
case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul
retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas
it is not so with other forms.

Reply Obj. 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason
of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be
raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its
proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for
its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when
separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination
to be united to the body.
_______________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 2]

Whether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the
Number of Bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not
multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one
intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied
in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial
substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown
above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in
one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but
one intellect in all men.

Obj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also
removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the
number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number
of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a
single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the
distinction of rewards and punishments.

Obj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my
in