nything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the
capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own
existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances
there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of
matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore
some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that
"which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]
Whether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For
those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a
like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of
animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is
alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing
more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as
the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the
condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are
corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to
nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But
as it is written (Wis. 2:2), "We are born of nothing"; which is true,
not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is
concluded in the same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had
not been," even as to our soul.
Obj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the
operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a
phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands
nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body
as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot
survive the dissolution of the body.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe
to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have
"an incorruptible substantial life."
_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellectual principle which
we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted
in two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any
substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the
generation or corruptio
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