ccount of the relation of the
object to the subject in the case of an _a priori_ judgement, while in
the case of an empirical judgement he ignores it. In other words, in
dealing with the general connexion between the qualities of an
object, he takes into account the fact that we are thinking it, but,
in dealing with the perception of the coexistence of particular
qualities of an object, he ignores the fact that we are perceiving it.
Further, that the real problem concerns all synthetic judgements alike
is shown by the solution which he eventually reaches. His conclusion
turns out to be that while both empirical and _a priori_ judgements
are valid of phenomena, they are not valid of things in themselves;
i. e. that of things in themselves we know nothing at all, not even
their particular qualities. Since, then, his conclusion is that even
empirical judgements are not valid of things in themselves, it shows
that the problem cannot be confined to _a priori_ judgements, and
therefore constitutes an implicit criticism of his statement of the
problem.

Must there not, however, be some problem peculiar to _a priori_
judgements? Otherwise why should Kant have been led to suppose that
his problem concerned them only? Further consideration will show that
there is such a problem, and that it was only owing to the mistake
indicated that Kant treated this problem as identical with that of
which he actually offered a solution. In the universal judgements of
mathematics we apprehend, as we think, general rules of connexion
which must apply to all possible cases. Such judgements, then,
presuppose a conformity between the connexions which we discover and
all possible instances. Now Kant's treatment of this conformity as a
conformity between our ideas and things has two implications. In the
first place, it implies, as has been pointed out, that relation to the
subject, as thinking, is taken into account in the case of the
universal connexion, and that relation to the subject, as perceiving,
is ignored in the case of the individual thing. In the second place,
it implies that what is related to the subject as the object of its
thought must be subjective or mental; that because we have to think
the general connexion, the connexion is only our own idea, the
conformity of things to which may be questioned. But the treatment, to
be consistent, should take account of relation to the subject in both
cases or in neither. If the former alternativ