ithout them. But it is said that although it be supposed
that God had made the nature of things different from that which it is,
or that from eternity He had decreed something else about Nature and her
order, it would not thence follow that any imperfection exists in God.
But if this be said, it must at the same time be allowed that God can
change His decrees. For if God had decreed something about Nature and
her order other than that which He has decreed--that is to say, if He
had willed and conceived something else about Nature--He would
necessarily have had an intellect and a will different from those which
He now has. And if it be allowed to assign to God another intellect and
another will without any change of His essence and of His perfection,
what is the reason why He cannot now change His decrees about creation
and nevertheless remain equally perfect? For His intellect and will
regarding created things and their order remain the same in relationship
to His essence and perfection in whatever manner His intellect and will
are conceived.

Moreover, all the philosophers whom I have seen admit that there is no
such thing as an intellect existing potentially in God, but only an
intellect existing actually. But since His intellect and His will are
not distinguishable from His essence, as all admit, it follows from this
also that if God had had another intellect actually and another will,
His essence would have been necessarily different, and hence, as I
showed at the beginning, if things had been produced by God in a manner
different from that in which they now exist, God's intellect and will,
that is to say, His essence (as has been granted), must have been
different, which is absurd.

Since, therefore, things could have been produced by God in no other
manner or order, this being a truth which follows from His absolute
perfection, there is no sound reasoning which can persuade us to believe
that God was unwilling to create all things which are in His intellect
with the same perfection as that in which they exist in His intellect.
But we shall be told that there is no perfection nor imperfection in
things, but that that which is in them by reason of which they are
perfect or imperfect and are said to be good or evil depends upon the
will of God alone, and therefore if God had willed He could have
effected that that which is now perfection should have been the extreme
of imperfection, and _vice versa_. But what else w