be so rapid or
debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart
handling of sails. For the blockading fleet it is also true that the
effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear,
can scarcely be so severe. But, on the other hand, the physical strain to
officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so
long at least as coal is the chief fuel. The wind no longer sets a measure
on the enemy's movements. Vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our
predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise.
Furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape;
now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. It is unnecessary
to labour the point. It is too obvious that a close blockade of the old
type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in
so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use.

What, then, can be done? Must we rest content in all situations with Howe's
system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity?
Cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? Assuredly it can. In
old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the
range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by
means of an inshore squadron. In these days of mobile defence that limit is
by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines,
that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn
and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be
established. A blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a
close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the
Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, will its incidents be materially
different. The distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at
first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact--the essence of close
blockade. But in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that
distance relatively. Quicker and more certain means of communication
between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and
the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to
bring things back to their old relations. At Port Arthur they did so
entirely. If then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the
enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make