or forbidding him the Gunfleet, he
pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of
themselves. For, as he repeated, "while we observe the French, they cannot
make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we
are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." Thus without specially noticing
the Minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his
intention was observation, and not simple retreat.
By the time Torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as
Beachy Head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the
following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. But still
confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he
refused to give the French the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as
soon as a drop in the wind permitted. So far he felt justified in
interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. He was
sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that
the Queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had
not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her."
So severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no
longer act. "What the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he
wrote in his Journal, "God Almighty only knows, but this I dare be positive
in, had I been left to my liberty I had prevented any attempt upon the
land, and secured the western ships, Killigrew, and the merchantmen."
Actually in all this he was successful. Slowly retiring eastward he drew
the French after him as far as Dover before he ran to the Nore; and
Tourville was unable to get back to the westward, till all the endangered
ships were safe in Plymouth. In spite of Torrington's being forced to fight
an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. Not
only had he prevented the French doing anything that could affect the issue
of the war, but he had completely foiled Tourville's plan of destroying the
British fleet in detail. That he had done, but retribution by passing to
the offensive was no longer in his power.
That Tourville or his Government was impressed with the efficacy of the
method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found
himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle
decision. During the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the
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